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Redeﬁning the Nation: Shifting
Boundaries of the ‘Other’ in Greece and
Turkey
IOANNIS N. GRIGORIADIS
The emergence of Greek and Turkish nationalisms, key events in the decline of the
Ottoman Empire, was conditioned by a set of divergent historical and political
circumstances. Greek nationalism was – in its early stages – a primarily diaspora
movement and an eﬀect of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. It aimed
at spreading the ideals which had gained so much appeal among Europe’s
progressive circles, liberate and simultaneously deﬁne the Greek nation. Turkish
nationalism was born during the nineteenth century, as the consecutive territorial
losses of the Ottoman Empire and a creeping zeitgeist change made clear to a part of
Ottoman Turkish elite that the survival of the Empire as a multiethnic state was
highly questionable and a Turkish nation-state had to be carved out of it.
Membership of both nations varied over time as criteria for deﬁning who is a Greek
and who is a Turk changed.
Zimmer has suggested a useful analytical tool for explaining the ‘process-like
nature of national identities’ as shifts of national identities. He introduced
‘voluntaristic’ and ‘organic boundary mechanisms’, which nationalists employ to
deﬁne the national self and other in a rather constructivist or deterministic way.
These are understood as Weberian ideal-types rather than as classiﬁcation schemes.
To deﬁne the nation inclusively or exclusively, one could variably utilize symbolic
resources, such as political values/institutions, culture, history and geography. These
provide the ‘symbolic raw material’ for the discursive construction of national
identities in the public realm. Zimmer argued that this distinction could heal the
weakness of the classical dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism when
employed to explore national identity through public discourse. It could also help
explain how the same symbolic resource could be used at diﬀerent historical periods
to address diﬀerent political problems by expanding or contracting the concept of
the ‘other’.1
This study aims to explore the inﬂuence of voluntaristic and organic models on the
formation of Greek and Turkish national identities. Following the model of Zimmer,
it will more speciﬁcally examine how inclusive and exclusive boundary mechanisms
have shaped Greek and Turkish national identity and variably aﬀected the position
of non-dominant groups. It will be argued that a shift from the predominance of
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voluntaristic to that of organic models is observed in both cases. Both nationalisms
initially used culture and political values on a voluntaristic basis for the construction
of respective national identities. Eventually, however, the deﬁnition of the ‘other’ in
both cases took increasingly organic dimensions. Coreligionists who did not wish to
assimilate but insisted on maintaining their linguistic or ethnic identity were treated
as ‘others’. In Greece, this issue related to the treatment of its small ethno-linguistic
minority groups, as well as the popular reaction to the immigration wave which
transformed Greek society in the 1990s. The case of an Albanian immigrant pupil is
explored to illustrate this process. In Turkey, as non-Muslim minorities had
diminished and immigration had not reached signiﬁcant dimensions, the role of the
‘other’ was eventually taken over by Turkey’s Kurdish minority. To prove the point,
the Nevruz events of March 2005 are used as an illustration. This study aims to
identify a pattern of historic-political conditions which favour a shift from
voluntaristic towards organic models. The demise of imperial order, the failure of
grand nationalist projects, migration and incomplete liberalization eﬀorts facilitate a
shift towards exclusive conceptions of national identity, which also means increasing
pressure towards immigrants and minorities.
Greek nationalism was a product of the European intellectual fermentation of the
eighteenth century and in its early stages was heavily inﬂuenced by French
republican nationalism. The convolution of French civic ideals and the millet2
tradition did not allow ethnicity to become a deﬁning element of Greek national
identity during the Neohellenic Enlightenment and the Independence War years. In
the work of Rigas Velestinlis,3 the boundary mechanism for the delineation of Greek
national identity was voluntaristic and deduced its symbols from republican political
values and institutions. The Ottoman territories comprised the common ‘fatherland’
(patrie), which would form the core of the new republic. The ‘other’ in the civic
nation that Rigas envisioned was the Ottoman ancien regime, the despotic state
which did not leave any room for individual autonomy and freedom. Christian,
Muslim and Jewish adherents of French republican principles were invited to join
forces, overthrow the Ottoman rule and establish a republic based on reason and a
civic form of Hellenic civilization.4
This civic conceptualization of Greek national identity did not prevail, as millet-
based divisions of the Ottoman society proved much stronger than the appeal of
French republican ideals across the Ottoman millets. The boundary mechanism for
the establishment of Greek national identity remained voluntaristic but only within
the borders of the Rum millet. It became more restrictive, as culture and language
were added to political values as key symbolic resources. All Balkan Christians were
invited to join the Hellenic culture, learn Greek and thus become eligible for Greek
citizenship. The importance of learning Greek is highlighted in several literary works
of the Neohellenic Enlightenment. Some of them aimed speciﬁcally at the
proliferation of Greek among non-Greek-speaking Christians. In the foreword of
his tetralingual Greek–Vlach–Bulgarian–Albanian dictionary published in 1802,
Daniel Moschopolitis extolled the virtues of Greek language and culture and invited
all Balkan Christians to adopt them. He added that such a move would facilitate
their upward social mobility within the Rum millet.5
Refocusing on the Rum millet meant that Christianity was restored as a basic
identity criterion of the Greek nation. Therefore, the boundary drawn excluded not
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only the despotic Ottoman Empire, but also its Muslim subjects. This ﬁtted Ottoman
social divisions and could be more easily popularized. According to Article 2x2 of
the Constitution promulgated on 1 January 1822 at the First Revolutionary
National Assembly in Epidaurus, ‘the autochthonous residents of the Greek
territory who believe in Jesus Christ are Greeks, enjoy all the civil rights without any
limitation and diﬀerence’.6 Greek citizenship comprised thus an open invitation to
all Ottoman Christians who were willing to join the revolutionary cause, regardless
of their ethnic descent or mother tongue. Apart from the endurance of millet
allegiances, this also reﬂected the diversity of the ethno-linguistic map of Ottoman
Balkans.7 Through the appropriation of Greek language and culture, Balkan and
Anatolian Christians could aspire to become full members of the Greek nation.
While culture and language were understood to be the key symbolic resources of
Greek national identity, their content was disputed. Adamantios Korais, arguably
the most inﬂuential intellectual of the Neohellenic Enlightenment, claimed that to
reach its ancient glory the Greek nation had to rid itself of all Ottoman and
Byzantine inﬂuences which had kept it apart from all intellectual developments in
Western Europe, recover its ancient culture and establish a secular state under the
name of ‘Hellas’. The very reinvigoration of the terms ‘Hellas’ and ‘Hellene’ had
major symbolic signiﬁcance. In Korais’ view Orthodoxy was not an indispensable
condition of Greek national identity; on the contrary, it was an obstacle to the
nation’s modernization. In a similar vein, Korais championed a comprehensive
language reform so that the vernacular Greek language would be relieved from all its
medieval Ottoman and Byzantine inﬂuences. The new idiom called ‘katharevoussa’
would be literally ‘pure’ of all foreign traces and adulterations.8
Korais’ complete rejection of Greece’s medieval heritage was not followed by
Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos, the most inﬂuential Greek historian of the
nineteenth century. In his magnus opus ‘History of the Greek Nation’, Paparrigo-
poulos attempted to reconcile ancient Greek and Byzantine historical legacies
through the introduction of a ‘Hellenic–Christian synthesis’.9 He also adopted the
periodization of Greek history into ancient, medieval and modern, ﬁrst suggested by
the historian Spyridon Zambelios. In contrast to Korais, who had dismissed
Orthodoxy, Paparrigopoulos subjugated Orthodoxy to Greek nationalism and made
it a key element of Greek national identity. Despite the universalistic message of
Orthodoxy which was then advanced by the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the newly-
established Church of Greece facilitated the transformation of Orthodoxy into a
cultural tool for the consolidation of Greek nationalism. In the nationalist visions of
both Korais and Paparrigopoulos, language and culture remained major symbolic
resources for the deﬁnition of Greek national identity. The delineation of the
boundaries of Greek national identity remained voluntaristic within the borders of
the Rum millet. This was necessary due to the launch of an ambitious nationalist
project. The ‘Great Idea’ (Megali Idea), espoused the ‘re-civilization’ of the Near
East through the expansion of Greece. Through the recovery of Byzantine territories
lost to the Ottomans, including its capital, and the restoration of a Hellenic Empire
over the Ottoman territories, Greece would fulﬁl its mission civilisatrice. Greece’s
ﬁrst Prime Minister Ioannis Kolettis is considered to have introduced the concept. In
the inaugural speech of the ﬁrst Greek Constitution in January 1844 he fervently
argued in front of the Greek Parliament in favour of the common destiny of Greeks
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inside and outside the borders of the Kingdom of Greece. About 30 years later,
Charles Tuckerman, the US Minister to Greece at the time, deﬁned Megali Idea as
follows:
Brieﬂy deﬁned the Great Idea means that the Greek mind is to regenerate the
East – that it is the destiny of Hellenism to Hellenize that vast stretch of
territory which by natural laws the Greeks believe to be theirs, and which is
chieﬂy inhabited by people claiming to be descended from Hellenic stock,
professing the Orthodox or Greek faith, or speaking the language.10
This project targeted all the Balkan and Anatolian Orthodox who were willing to
adopt Hellenic culture and language. The complex and diverse reality of the
Ottoman Rum millet was co-opted in favour of a nationalist ideology which hailed
the renaissance of a Hellenic nation that aspired to a leading role, as well as a mission
civilisatrice in South-eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. The territorial
expansion of Greece into Ottoman Balkan territories required a ﬂexible approach
towards local Christian populations, which often spoke Albanian, Bulgarian or
Vlach. Co-opting these populations was a key element for the success of Greek
expansionist strategies, so ethnic nationalism could not ﬁt. Overlooking the element
of language and ethnicity was in any case compatible with the millet legacy.
Naturally Megali Idea was also met with uncertainty and opposition in the
Ottoman lands. Putting aside Ottoman reaction, competing Balkan nationalisms,
Bulgarian, Serbian, Romanian and Albanian, fought for the loyalty of Ottoman
Christians. Besides, the nationalist elite of the Kingdom of Greece could not yet
claim ideological hegemony over the whole of Greek-speaking populations. The
Ottoman Empire still hosted large, rich and educated Greek-speaking populations,
some of whom met Megali Idea with suspicion. The Ecumenical Patriarchate and a
part of the Ottoman Greek elite maintained their allegiance to their imperial
Orthodox identity, which was irreconcilable with organic deﬁnitions of national
identity. At least at the beginning, the Ecumenical Patriarchate spearheaded
opposition to growing nationalisms within the Rum millet, as its spiritual and
political authority was severely challenged.11 The establishment of the Bulgarian
Exarchate in 1870 precipitated the fragmentation of the Rum millet into several
competing ethnic groups. In addition, the network of Athens-supported educational
institutions proved a major –albeit sometimes insuﬃcient– tool for the spread of
Hellenic language, culture and national identity throughout the Ottoman Empire.12
The competition between the Hellenic and the Rum deﬁnitions of Greek national
identity came to an abrupt end in the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century with the
wars that led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. These marked the acceleration
of the violent process of nation-state formation in the Ottoman domain. The defeat
of the Greek military forces in Anatolia in August 1922, the 1923 Mandatory
Population Exchange Agreement between Greece and Turkey and the 1923 Treaty of
Lausanne meant the end ofMegali Idea, sealed the establishment of the hegemony of
Hellenic national ideology over practically the totality of Greeks13 and triggered a
transformation of Greek nationalism. Irredentism retreated to allow space for more
introspective visions of Greek national identity.14 This meant that organic deﬁnitions
of Greek national identity would gain impetus over voluntaristic ones. Cultural and
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linguistic diversity became less tolerated, and this had its impact upon the treatment
of minorities, linguistic and ethnic. Aiming to consolidate the Hellenization of
recently annexed territories, a sweeping set of legislative measures renamed hundreds
of towns and villages, changing their Bulgarian, Turkish or Albanian names into
Greek. Slav Macedonians became victims of social discrimination and faced
increasing assimilation pressures.15 The 1936–41 dictatorship of Ioannis Metaxas
and the Greek Civil War ﬁrmly established the preponderance of exclusive
deﬁnitions of Greek national identity. It was in the Metaxas era that the claim of
ethnic continuity from ancient to modern Greece became most explicit and a cult of
ancient Greek civilization developed.16 The treatment of minority groups
deteriorated sharply. The Second World War, Greece’s occupation by Germany
and the ensuing Civil War also contributed to the homogenization of the population.
The vast majority of Greece’s Jewish population perished in Nazi concentration
camps or emigrated to Israel in the aftermath of the war.17 At the same time,
minority groups, such as the Chams and Slav Macedonians, were expelled en masse
on the grounds of their alleged collaboration with foreign occupation forces and/or
the communist forces during the 1946–49 Civil War.18 This had major ramiﬁcations
in the post-war treatment of minorities, which was also reﬂected in legislation.
Article 19 of the Nationality Code, which was established by Legislative Decree 3370
in 1955, stated that a ‘Greek citizen of non-Greek descent (allogenis) who left the
Greek territory with no intent of return may be declared as having lost his Greek
citizenship’. The article explicitly divided Greek citizens into two categories on the
basis of their ethnic descent. Those of ‘Greek descent’ enjoyed a strong protection of
their citizenship, while those who were deemed by state oﬃcials to be ‘of non-Greek
descent’ faced the risk of losing their citizenship, regardless of their integration into
the Greek nation. Through this Article thousands of members of Greece’s minorities
who had left the country for various reasons lost their Greek nationality. Following
strong protests by human rights groups, the Article was abolished in 1998.
Meanwhile, approximately 60,000 Greek citizens had lost their citizenship under its
provisions, and the abolition had no retroactive eﬀect.19
Things changed signiﬁcantly in the 1990s, when Greek national identity was
questioned under the pressure of three major events: the end of the Cold War,
migration and European integration. The end of the Cold War meant that old
nationalist disputes, which had remained frozen due to the bipolar division of
Europe, could re-emerge. Greek society responded in a phobic manner to the revival
of the Macedonian question following the demise of Yugoslavia.20 In addition, the
migration wave which swept Greece changed the country’s social fabric. The inﬂux
of hundreds of thousands of immigrants from Eastern and Southeastern Europe –
particularly Albania – Asia and Africa resulted in the transformation of Greek
society from being virtually mono-ethnic to become increasingly multiethnic and
multicultural. For the ﬁrst time since the homogenization brought about by wars and
population exchanges in the early twentieth century, Greek society faced the
challenge of accommodating large alien populations. Greece was transformed from a
net exporter to a net importer of immigrant labour. The integration of these groups
inevitably rekindled the discussion about the meaning of being Greek. Moreover, the
process of European integration questioned Greek national identity from a totally
diﬀerent supranational perspective. It sparked discussions about the relationship of
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Greece with the West and the Middle East and the complementarity of Greek and
European identities.
The use of language and culture as symbolic resources of contemporary Greek
nationhood was manifested in the case of the high-school student Odysseas Tsenai
(Odhise Qenaj) that twice attracted media attention in the early 2000s and opened a
nationwide debate on what it means to be Greek.21 A son of Albanian immigrants,
living in the town of Nea Michaniona near Thessaloniki, Qenaj enrolled in a local
state high school and became the best student in his class. The right to bear the
Greek ﬂag in national student parades – a relic of the Metaxas era – is reserved as a
privilege for the best students of the ninth and twelfth grade. The prospect of him
bearing the Greek ﬂag in the student parade of 28 October 2000 provoked a ﬁerce
backlash within the local community. In their opinion, Qenaj could not carry the
Greek ﬂag because he was an ethnic Albanian and had no aﬃliation to it; he would
never defend it in case of a war. Although the Minister of Education Petros
Efthymiou supported the right of Qenaj to bear the ﬂag, Qenaj ﬁnally opted not to
antagonize the local community and withdrew. Even the intervention of the
President of the Republic Konstantinos Stephanopoulos did not result in much
support for him.22 The same situation occurred three years later in October 2003,
when Qenaj again won the right to carry the Greek ﬂag in the twelfth grade. Qenaj’s
classmates and the Parents and Guardians’ Association of his high school objected
to Qenaj’s appointment and asked that the ministerial decision allowing foreign
students to carry the Greek ﬂag on national celebrations and parades be abolished.
Eventually Qenaj withdrew again. As he said during a TV interview, he was
forfeiting his right to bear the Greek ﬂag because he had been put in a diﬃcult
position and simply wished to avert any possible incidents during the celebrations.
He also expressed his disappointment that his case had divided the town community,
which –he had thought– would have changed its position by now. In the meantime,
Qenaj had been baptized an Orthodox. However, this decision did not alter the
position of the local community which still viewed him as a foreigner.
Qenaj’s double forfeiture of his right to bear the Greek ﬂag reduced the tension
but also showed the extent to which organic notions of national identity had spread
in wide segments of Greek society. Despite the verbal support of high oﬃcials, local
reaction did not dissipate and in the end prevailed. His appropriation of Greek
language and culture, success in Greek public education, and signalled willingness to
integrate into Greek society did not suﬃce. This was in stark contrast with the
aforementioned argument of Moschopolitis who considered Greek language and
culture as the touchstone for the integration of Balkan Christians into the Greek
nation. Anti-immigrant fears were strong enough to convert Qenaj from a model
immigrant teenager into a sui generis ‘national threat’.
What is more interesting is Qenaj’s attempt to signal his willingness to fully
integrate into the local community by being baptized. His membership of the
Orthodox Church would have facilitated his integration, had voluntaristic boundary
mechanisms continued to apply within the borders of existing millets. Nevertheless,
organic boundary mechanisms were now applying even against coreligionists. His
conversion to Orthodox Christianity failed to change the attitude of the Nea
Michaniona community. Being a son of an Albanian immigrant, he was deemed
permanently unﬁt to become a Greek.23 His case illustrates the extent to which
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foreign immigrants have become ‘otherized’ by Greek popular nationalist discourses
in the aftermath of the Cold War. It also underlines the strength of organic boundary
mechanisms in the deﬁnition of Greek national identity, which clearly diverge from
the millet legacy. In the Ottoman era, Albanian-speaking Orthodox were considered
to be an indispensable part of the Rum millet.
On the other hand, it needs to be mentioned that the Qenaj case served as a
rallying point for politicians, intellectuals and civil society groups who favoured a
redeﬁnition of Greek national identity along more voluntaristic lines. Pointing at the
emerging multiethnic and multicultural character of post-Cold War Greece, they
argued that Greek society should become more inclusive of those immigrants who
had joined it and adopted its culture and language. In the Qenaj case, both sides used
language and culture as essential symbolic resources of Greek national identity.
While the Nea Michaniona community expressed an organic understanding of Greek
national identity, voluntaristic understandings of Greek national identity were
expressed by a diverse group of politicians, intellectuals and civil society groups.
Given the increasing diversiﬁcation of Greek society and rising participation of
immigrants’ children in Greek public education, the issue remained in public
discourse. It attracted again a lot of attention when the newly-elected PASOK
government announced in late 2009 its intention to reform the Greek Nationality
Code with the aim to facilitate the acquisition of Greek citizenship by immigrants.
The amended Nationality Code came into force in March 2010.
A parallel shift from voluntaristic to organic deﬁnitions of national identity is also
observed in the case of Turkey. Since the late Ottoman years, symbolic resources
have been employed for both inclusive and exclusive deﬁnitions of Ottoman and
Turkish identity. Early Ottoman reformers espoused Ottomanism, a voluntaristic,
civic version of institutional Ottoman patriotism based on common political values
and geography. Ottoman Muslims and non-Muslims would be treated as equal
citizens and members of a religion- and ethnicity-free Ottoman nation. This was
suggested by the Tanzimat reforms, in particular the Imperial Rescript (Hatt-ı
Hu¨mayun) of 1856, which clearly stated in its ﬁrst article:
The guarantees promised on our part by the Imperial Rescript of the Rose
Bower and the laws of the Tanzimat to all the subjects of my Empire, without
distinction of class or religion, for the security of their persons and their
property and the preservation of their honour, are today being conﬁrmed and
consolidated, and eﬃcacious measures shall be taken in order that they may
have their full and entire eﬀect.24
The most outspoken representative of Ottomanism was Prince Sabahaddin. He
advocated a federalized, decentralized Ottoman state, where the Ottoman sultan
would become a symbolic head of state, the equivalent of the British monarch.25
Ottomanism remained the oﬃcial state policy and maintained its appeal among
Ottoman liberals who thought that an Ottoman religion- and ethnie-blind citizenship
was not a chimerical target and was the only possible way to forestall the imminent
disintegration of the Ottoman patrie along national lines.26
Organic boundary mechanisms were applied by pan-Islamism, which advocated
the uniﬁcation of all Muslims under the Ottoman Sultan in his function as Caliph,
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and pan-Turkism, which aimed to unite all Turkic peoples under the same state. One
of the thinkers whose work contributed to the rise of pan-Islamism was Namık
Kemal, a leading ﬁgure of the Young Ottoman movement and one of the most
inﬂuential Ottoman intellectuals of the nineteenth century. While he was profoundly
inﬂuenced by Enlightenment ideas, Namık Kemal did not consider Islam to be
responsible for the decline of the Ottoman Empire. On the contrary, he viewed the
restoration of true Islamic faith as the foundation of an Ottoman renaissance. In his
writings, Namık Kemal popularized the terms ‘vatan’ and ‘millet’, giving to them the
equivalent meaning of patrie and nation.27 In his play ‘Vatan yahut Silistre’, the
Danubian provinces of the Ottoman Empire become a part of the Ottoman patrie.
Namık Kemal urged Ottoman citizens to to rally around the vatan and defend it
against foreign invasion. Yet what he understood as Ottoman citizen diﬀered from
Ottomanism. His appeal primarily extended to Ottoman Muslims. Thus he applied a
voluntaristic boundary mechanism within the Muslim millet, while he excluded
Ottoman Christians on the basis of their religion. In Namık Kemal’s Ottoman patrie,
Ottoman Christians would be tolerated, but they would not form a constituent part
of the Ottoman nation.28
Pan-Turkism, which aimed to unite all Turkic peoples under Ottoman
sovereignty, found its staunchest supporters in Ismail Gaspıralı and Yusuf Akc¸ura,
both Russia-born Tatar intellectuals. In Akc¸ura’s famous essay on the future path of
Turkish nationalism ‘U¨c¸ Tarz-i Siyaset’ (Three Ways of Politics), he clearly rejected
Ottomanism and concomitantly the voluntaristic use of boundary mechanisms for
the shaping of Ottoman national identity.29 In his later works, he declared his
preference of pan-Turkism as the foundational element of Turkish national identity.
Organic boundary mechanisms focusing on Turkic culture and history were
employed with the aim to exclude not only non-Muslim Ottomans, but also non-
Turkish Ottoman Muslims.
Ottomanism remained the line advocated – in public, at least – by the leaders of
the 1908 Young Turk Revolution. Yet it was soon abandoned in view of subsequent
political and military developments. The outbreak of the Balkan Wars resulted in
heavy territorial losses for the Empire against the Balkan Christian nation-states.
Ottomanism was abandoned, and the transformation of the Ottoman state into a
Turkish nation-state became the new task. Turkish nationalists took the chance to
put forward their national homogenization programme through massacres and
displacements of non-Muslims.30 Under the pressure of military defeat, organic
deﬁnitions of national identity gained an advantage. Culture and language remained
major symbolic resources of Turkishness. This became clear in the policies of the
Young Turk governments, especially following the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in
October 1912.
Culture was elevated to the basic principle of Turkish nationalism by Ziya
Go¨kalp. Born in the city of Diyarbakır, Go¨kalp, who had Kurdish ethnic origins, is
considered the intellectual father of republican Turkish nationalism. In the words of
Parla, he was ‘the oﬃcial ideologue of the Committee of Union and Progress and the
unoﬃcial ideologue of the Kemalists’.31 His theory of cultural Turkish nationalism
evolved in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, when it was becoming increasingly
clear that Ottomanism was bound to fail. Go¨kalp attempted to compromise Turkish
nationalism with modernity and Islam by diﬀerentiating between civilization
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(medeniyet), culture (hars) and religion (din). He deﬁned civilization in technological
and political terms. Culture was the set of values and beliefs which deﬁne a people
and restricted religion into its essential content. The Turkish nation should adopt
Western civilization and rediscover its own Turkish culture, which had faded under
the inﬂuence of Arab culture. Islam had to be dissociated from Arab culture and
restricted to the private sphere.32
With Go¨kalp, culture becomes the essential symbolic resource for the deﬁnition of
Turkishness. However, the boundary mechanism of Turkish national identity diﬀers
from Muslim and non-Muslim minorities. It remains voluntaristic in the case of
Muslims, while it becomes organic in the case of non-Muslims. Full integration and
citizen rights were available to all Muslim citizens of republican Turkey regardless of
their ethnic or linguistic origins, provided they adopted the two key symbolic
resources of Turkish national identity, Turkish language and culture. The highest
ranks of government and bureaucracy were amenable to Turkish citizens of Kurdish,
Arab, Circassian, Albanian or Laz descent, who had internalized the principles of
Kemalist republican nationalism and were willing to adopt Turkish national identity.
Nonetheless, those who wished to maintain their ethnic or linguistic identity
encountered state discrimination.33 The resettlement of non-Turkish-speaking
Muslims in Anatolia was carefully planned so that their languages would be
assimilated into Turkish. In addition, emphasis was given on the honour and beneﬁts
of being a Turk and speaking Turkish.34 The suppression of several Kurdish
uprisings in the early republican years provided evidence of republican Turkish
resolve to continue the homogenization programme of all its non-Turkish Muslim
ethnic and linguistic groups. Recognizing equal citizenship rights for all Muslims was
also a familiar reverberation of the Ottoman millet system, yet Islam had lost its
primacy in republican nation-building policies, and citizenship could now be based
exclusively on republican Turkish principles.
Anti-minority policies which followed in the republican period were a continua-
tion and elaboration of analogous measures taken in the last years of the Ottoman
Empire.35 However, this was not the case for members of the three oﬃcially
recognized non-Muslim minorities, Armenians, Greeks and Jews, as well as
Assyrians, Catholics and Protestants. An organic understanding of Turkish national
identity was the guiding principle behind measures referring to the non-Muslim
minorities which had remained in republican Turkey. Non-Muslims were deemed
non-assimilable and persistently suspected as ‘internal enemies’ (ic¸ du¨s¸manlar). Even
in cases where some minority members expressed their will to assimilate to Turkish
culture and language, this was not welcomed by state authorities. Republican state
policies aimed to minimize the role of non-Muslims in Turkish economy and
eventually force them into emigration.36 In 1934, the ‘Resettlement Law’ ( _Iskaˆn
Kanunu) aimed to forcefully relocate the Jews from Thrace and the Marmara region
to Istanbul. Similar measures were also taken for the small surviving Armenian
populations of Anatolia. Campaigns such as the ‘Citizen speak Turkish’ (Vatandas¸
Tu¨rkc¸e konus¸) campaign aimed to eliminate the public use of minority languages. In
1942 an extraordinary Property Tax (Varlık Vergisi) was imposed, allegedly to tax
wartime proﬁteering. Its real aim though was the economic decimation of the vibrant
non-Muslim merchant class of Istanbul.37 About a decade later, on 6–7 September
1955, a pogrom against Istanbul Greeks on the pretext of the bombing of Kemal
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Atatu¨rk’s house in Thessaloniki dealt a heavy blow to both the Greek population of
Istanbul and the democratic face of republican Turkey.38 Such state policies
embedded the ‘otherizing’ of Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities. Various terms were
coined to display their inferior status: ‘local foreigners’ (yerli yabancılar), ‘citizens of
foreign origin’ (yabancı uyruklu vatandas¸lar), ‘guest citizens’ (misaﬁr vatandas¸lar).
These terms appeared in court decisions and other oﬃcial documents.39 In the long
run, this also resulted in the stigmatization of the term ‘minority’ in Turkish public
discourse.
While the policy of marginalizing non-Muslims largely met with success, the
assimilation of Turkey’s Muslim minorities came under question. Since the 1960s, the
Kurdish nationalist movement has succeeded in forestalling the assimilation of a
large number of Turkish citizens of Kurdish descent and developing a Kurdish
national identity. A part of it, the Kurdish Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren
Kurdistan – PKK) has challenged Turkish sovereignty in the south-eastern and
eastern provinces of Turkey. The response of the Turkish state to the rise of Kurdish
nationalism involved the use of Islamic culture as symbolic resource of Turkishness.
The elaboration of a ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ (Tu¨rk- _Islam Sentezi) highlighted the
role of Islamic culture in the formation of Turkish national identity. This culture,
which was perceived as the common heritage of all the Muslims of Turkey, comprised
the key cementing factor of an all-inclusive Turkish nation. This model was matched
by an intensiﬁcation of repression against those Kurds who refused to assimilate.
The improvement of EU–Turkey relations and Turkey’s wish to comply with the
Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership helped bring an end to the systematic
persecution of the Kurdish minority. The new social environment allowed for
substantial reforms, which included liberalization in minority rights legislation and
the opening of a debate on Turkish national identity. Views advocating a
voluntaristic basis for Turkishness gained impetus and culminated with the
publication of a report advocating a civic understanding of Turkish national
identity, based not on Turkish ethnic descent but on citizenship of the Republic of
Turkey (Tu¨rkiyelilik).40 These eﬀorts aimed to heal the mounting tension between
Turks and Kurds and sparked an unprecedented public debate on the topic. While
the reform process slowed considerably after 2005, the launch of TRT S¸es¸, a
Kurdish-language state television channel, in January 2009 provided evidence that
the reform process was not derailed. In fact, in early 2009 the Turkish government
announced a new initiative, the ‘Kurdish Opening’ (Ku¨rt Ac¸ılımı). This comprised a
set of measures aiming to promote Kurdish minority rights. Among several measures
discussed, a partial amnesty was included. On 19 October 2009, a group of 34 PKK
members were allowed to enter Turkey without being arrested. Yet later the initiative
seemed to lose traction due to stiﬀ opposition by the major opposition parties and
the opposition of a large part of Turkish public opinion. The closure of the pro-
Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (DTP) by the Constitutional Court on 11
December 2009 introduced a serious additional obstacle.
Opposition to minority rights reform was often linked to organic understandings
of Turkish national identity and remained popular in social discourse. These
coincided with rising anti-Kurdish sentiment in the 1990s, linked to the peak of PKK
activity and military operations in south-eastern Anatolia. Incidents in which
high tension between Turks and Kurds were observed became increasingly common.
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At times, this seemed to present a serious threat to Turkey’s social stability and
cohesion. Not only PKK sympathizers but all Kurds became targets of Turkish
nationalist groups. Incidents of anti-Kurdish violence expressed a wider feeling of
resentment in Turkish society41 This was further strengthened by developments in
Iraq in the aftermath of the 2003 US invasion. The prospect of Kurdish autonomy or
independence in Northern Iraq raised fears for Turkish territorial integrity.42 In
addition, persistent EU interest in the recognition and full respect of Kurdish
minority rights in Turkey also antagonized Turkish nationalists who attempted to
present Turkey’s Kurdish question as an EU tool for the destabilization of Turkey.
Last but not least, steps towards better protection of Kurdish minority rights in the
context of Turkey’s EU accession process caused a reaction among a large part of
Turkey’s population. Under these circumstances, organic boundary mechanisms
were employed to ‘otherize’ a Muslim group for the ﬁrst time in republican Turkish
history. As Turkey’s non-Muslims had fallen into numerical and social insignif-
icance, Kurds substituted them in Turkish nationalist discourse. They represented
the new ‘other’, the new ‘internal enemy’ (ic¸ du¨s¸man)43 of Turkish nationalism.
A manifestation of the popularity of organic understandings of Turkish national
identity was a new trend observed in March 2005. Nevruz (Newroz in Kurdish), the
traditional celebration for the beginning of spring, has often become the setting for
Kurdish nationalist demonstrations.44 The March 2005 festivities devolved into
violent clashes with the police in several Turkish cities when some demonstrators
appeared with PKK ﬂags and portraits of the PKK’s incarcerated leader Abdullah
O¨calan. The incident which attracted the biggest attention took place in Mersin, a
city in southern Turkey with a large Kurdish immigrant population. During a
demonstration a small group of Kurdish children attempted to burn a Turkish ﬂag
but were stopped by a plain-clothes police oﬃcer. On the following day, the Turkish
military intervened. A statement of the Chief of General Staﬀ Hilmi O¨zko¨k
addressed to the ‘Great Turkish Nation’ noted:
The innocent activities organized to celebrate the arrival of spring have been
turned by a group devoid of values . . . into an attack against the Turkish ﬂag,
the symbol of the sublime Turkish nation. . . . In its long history, the Turkish
nation has gone through good and bad days, treasons as well as victories.
However, it has never faced such a heinous act committed by its own pseudo-
citizens in its own homeland.45
The government and opposition leaders fully supported the statement of the Chief of
Staﬀ, and a nationwide rally around the Turkish ﬂag was launched. A video
recording of the incident was repeatedly broadcast by national electronic media with
the aim to raise popular wrath and participation in demonstrations aiming to restore
the respect due to Turkey’s national symbol. The Higher Council for Radio and
Television (Radyo-Televizyon U¨st Kurulu – RTU¨K) requested that all television
channels display a Turkish ﬂag on their programmes. Flag rallies were organized
while thousands of Turkish ﬂags were displayed in ﬂats, cars and public buildings for
many days.46
At the same time, anti-Kurdish sentiment reached a peak and frequently turned
into violence. Violent demonstrations were organized by far-right groups in Mersin
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and several other Turkish cities with signiﬁcant Kurdish populations. On 6 April
2005 ﬁve young members of the leftist association TAYAD distributing leaﬂets
protesting against prison conditions were barely saved from lynching in Trabzon by
a mob which thought that they were Kurds about to desecrate the Turkish ﬂag. On
several occasions, the oﬃces of the pro-Kurdish Democratic People’s Party
(Demokratik Halk Partisi – DEHAP) were attacked by mobsters in several cities,
while Kurdish immigrants in western Turkey became the target of nationalist wrath.
In August 2005, ﬁve Kurds were almost lynched following a row with locals in
Seferihisar, a small town in western Turkey. In September 2005, in the western
Anatolian town of Bozu¨yu¨k, members of far-right groups ambushed two buses
carrying Kurdish activists aiming to organize a demonstration in support of the
imprisoned leader of the PKK Abdullah O¨calan. One of the buses was set on ﬁre and
tens of people suﬀered injuries. Numerous similar incidents of a smaller scale raised
serious concerns about peace and social stability.47
While the level of anti-Kurdish violence was alarming, the language introduced by
the military statement had also wider implications. The expression ‘pseudo-citizen’
(so¨zde vatandas¸) was reminiscent of the terms ‘local foreigner’ (yerli yabancı) or
‘foreign citizen’ (yabancı vatandas¸) which were often used for non-Muslim minorities
in state documents.48 This underlined a new rising attitude against the Kurds. In
republican Turkey, Kurds were usually invited to jettison their distinct ethnic and
linguistic features and join mainstream national identity. A voluntaristic deﬁnition of
Turkish national identity was applied. Kurds were seen as ‘prospective Turks’
(mu¨stakbel Tu¨rkler) in terms of their ability to assimilate into mainstream Turkish
national identity, as long as they adopted the Turkish nation’s symbolic resources,
language, culture and Kemalist political values. Now they were increasingly seen as
the ‘enemy within’ and ‘pseudo-citizens’.49 As organic understandings of Turkish
national identity were no longer directed towards non-Muslim citizens only, the
Kurds were seen as unﬁt to become real Turkish citizens in the eyes of not only
extreme nationalists, but also military bureaucrats. This contradicted decades-long
state policies which favoured the homogenization of Turkey’s Kurdish population
into the mainstream national identity and highlighted the appeal of organic
boundary mechanisms for deﬁning Turkish national identity.
Opinions defending a more inclusive, voluntaristic understanding of Turkish
national identity were also strong. They became particularly pronounced in the
context of Turkey’s EU accession process and its need to comply with the
‘Copenhagen Criteria’, which included protection of minority rights. Their public
appeal became, however, a function of the reform process and EU–Turkey relations.
The deceleration of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations had an impact on the
Turkish government’s willingness to confront deep-rooted nationalist sensitivities by
championing signiﬁcant reforms in the ﬁeld of minority rights, as well as a new
multicultural citizenship. Repeated eﬀorts of the AKP government to reach a
breakthrough in the Kurdish question only highlighted the pressing nature of the
problem. The launch and withering of the government’s 2009 ‘Kurdish Opening’
manifested its intentions as well as its limitations.
Following the model suggested by Zimmer, this study has explored the shift from
voluntaristic to organic boundary mechanisms for the deﬁnition of Greek and
Turkish national identities and concomitantly the deﬁnition of the ‘other’ in both
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nationalist discourses. These processes shared signiﬁcant commonalities. At the
beginning of nationalist awakening, which took place in the Ottoman imperial
setting, Greek and Turkish national identities were deﬁned on a voluntaristic basis
initially across the Ottoman millets, but eventually within their respective limits. This
was a result of the long-lasting millet-based identiﬁcation of Ottoman populations,
which French republican values could not overwhelm. In addition, it was a result of
the aim to maximize the appeal of their irredentist claims against populations which
had strong religious but uncertain national aﬃliations. The adoption of the national
language and culture could make up for linguistic and ethnic, but not for religious
diversity. With the transition from the imperial to the nation-state era and the
collapse of grand nationalist projects though, both nationalisms reduced their
ambitions and scope, became introverted and increasingly exclusive. Symbolic
resources such as language and culture were invoked as organic boundary
mechanisms for the deﬁnition of national identity. Ethnic and linguistic minorities,
which had been appealed to in the process of nationalist irredentism, and immigrant
groups became targets of assimilation policies. Even the millet legacy proved unable
to forestall the ‘otherization’ of coreligionists who claimed a distinct linguistic and/or
ethnic background. Under these conditions, a pattern of historic-political conditions
emerges which favours a transition from voluntaristic towards organic models.
First, the end of the imperial era reduces the scope of nationalist projects within
narrower borders. Nationalists lose interest in promoting the proliferation of
national language and culture beyond the borders of their nation-states, while
symbolic resources are employed to identify the nation on an organic basis. The
impact of the failure of grand nationalist projects is similar. The failure of theMegali
Idea and pan-Islamism meant that Greek and Turkish nationalist projects would
have to limit their territorial ambitions and would not have to assimilate disparate
populations whose common characteristic was often only religion. Transition
towards an organic understanding of national identity was also helped by the
population movements which highlighted the end of the imperial era. The expulsion
of minorities and massacres, which were often the result of clashing nationalist
projects, reduced the diversity of nascent nation-states.
Moreover, migration and incomplete or ongoing liberalization eﬀorts often
become triggers for the articulation of organic understandings of national identity in
public discourse. The emergence of sizeable immigrant populations in mono-cultural
societies which gradually transform into multicultural ones have often met with the
reaction of segments of the majority. These rally around symbolic resources of
nationhood such as language and culture which are applied in an organic fashion.
This is similar to the eﬀect of incomplete democratic consolidation eﬀorts, which is
linked with improved protection of minority rights. Expanding the score of minority
rights can also lead to a similar reaction to the extent that this initiative has not
gained legitimacy in wide segments of the society.
While organic understandings of national identity are strong in both Greece and
Turkey, public views championing voluntaristic models of national identity have
also been pronounced. These have become stronger due to the process of
Europeanization in both countries and the challenges posed by European
integration. In Greece, the issue was raised during civil society campaigns on the
recognition of the novel multicultural and multiethnic character of Greek society
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and the rights of immigrants and minorities. In Turkey, these views gained impetus
with the EU reform process in the early 2000s, which entailed sweeping changes in
human and minority rights legislation. It culminated with the publication of the
report which advocated a civic redeﬁnition of Turkish national identity and the
ensuing public debate. Given the current dynamics of national identity formation,
voluntaristic models of deﬁning Greek and Turkish national identities may become
stronger in the near future. Such a development could be facilitated by the evolution
of the European integration project and the forging of a civic, value-based
European identity. This could resolve questions arising from the need to recognize
Greece’s transformation into a multiethnic and multicultural society, as well as full
citizenship rights to the members of Turkey’s minorities. While far from complete,
the reform of the Greek Nationality Code and the ‘Kurdish Opening’ allude to that
trend.
Notes
1. O. Zimmer, ‘Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process-Oriented Approach
to National Identity’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol.9, No.2 (2003), pp.177–81.
2. The millet system could be deﬁned as the organizational framework of the relations between the
Ottoman Empire and its religious communities.
3. Rigas Velestinlis was a writer, revolutionary and a leading ﬁgure of Neohellenic Enlightenment.
4. V. Roudometof, Nationalism, Globalization and Orthodoxy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001),
pp.62–3.
5. P.M. Kitromilides, ‘Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans’,
in M. Blinkhorn and T. Veremis (eds.), Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality (Athens:
ELIAMEP, 1990), pp.26–7.
6. Interestingly there was no diﬀerentiation between Orthodox and Catholic Christians, despite the
identiﬁcation of the Rum millet with Orthodoxy.
7. Rigas himself was of Vlach extraction, while many of the leading ﬁgures of the Greek War of
Independence were ‘Arvanitai’, Albanian-speaking members of the Rum millet, who lived in large
parts of Southern and Western Greece.
8. V. Roudometof, ‘From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularization, and National
Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453–1821’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol.16, No.1
(1998), pp.25–6.
9. K. Paparrigopoulos, History of the Hellenic Nation [Istorı´a Tou EllZniko ´Eynou&] (Athens: Hermes
[Erm&], 1970).
10. C.W. Tuckerman, The Greeks of Today (New York: Putnam, 1872), p.120, cited in R.S. Peckham,
‘Map Mania: Nationalism and the Politics of Place in Greece: 1870–1922’, Political Geography,
Vol.19, No.1 (2000), p.85.
11. J.S. Koliopoulos and T. Veremis, Greece, the Modern Sequel: From 1821 to the Present (London:
Hurst & Co., 2002), pp.145–8.
12. On this, see Kitromilides, ‘Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the
Balkans’, pp.45–51, and S. Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of
Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909 (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999),
pp.106–7.
13. On the transformation process of the Rum millet into the modern Greek nation, see R. Clogg,
‘The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire’, in B. Braude and B. Lewis (eds.), Christians and Jews in
the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society (New York: Holmes and Meier
Publishers, 1982), and F. Benlisoy and S. Benlisoy, ‘Millet-I Rum’dan Helen Ulusuna’, in M.O¨.
Alkan (ed.), Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Du¨s¸u¨nce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Mes¸rutiyet’in Birikimi (_Istanbul:
_Iletis¸ım, 2001).
14. Greek irredentist claims over Cyprus and southern Albania (or northern Epirus) were not able to
maintain ‘Megali Idea’ in the key position it enjoyed in Greek national ideology until 1922.
180 I. N. Grigoriadis
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
5:2
3 1
5 J
uly
 20
14
 
15. A. Karakasidou, ‘Cultural Illegitimacy in Greece: The Slavo-Macedonian ‘Non-Minority’’’, in
R. Clogg (ed.), Minorities in Greece: Aspect of a Plural Society (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002),
pp.130–36.
16. Koliopoulos and Veremis, Greece, the Modern Sequel, p.136.
17. S. Bowman, ‘Jews’, in Clogg (ed.), Minorities in Greece.
18. U. O¨zkırımlı and S.A. Sofos, Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey (London: Hurst
and Co., 2008), pp.160–61.
19. N. Sitaropoulos, ‘Freedom of Movement and the Right to a Nationality vs. Ethnic Minorities: The
Case of Ex Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code’, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol.6,
No.3 (2004), pp.205–6.
20. A. Triandafyllidou, ‘National Identity and the ‘Other’’’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.21, No.4
(1998), pp.604–7.
21. For more on this, see R. Tzanelli, ‘‘‘Not My Flag!’’ Citizenship and Nationhood in the Margins of
Europe’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.29, No.1 (2006, pp.27–31).
22. Stephanopoulos quoted the famous deﬁnition of Hellenicity by Isocrates, according to which ‘the
name of the Greeks has come to characterize not an ethnic group but a mindset, and Greeks are called
those who are participants in our culture and not our common ethnic descent’. See K. Kantouris,
‘Clamour About Odysseas’ . . . Odyssey’ [Katakraug gia tZn . . . Odsseia tou Oduss¼a], Ta N¼a
[Ta Nea], 30 Oct. 2000.
23. This was in stark contrast with the open invitation which Greek nationalism extended in the nineteenth
century to Albanian-speaking Christians to join Greek language, culture and national identity.
24. B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd edition (Oxford, London and New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), p.134.
25. Ibid., p.204.
26. The legacy of the millet system had made the use of civic-political values as symbolic resources
extremely diﬃcult when it referred to forging a new nation across the millet divides.
27. E.J. Zu¨rcher, Turkey: A Modern History, New edition (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p.68.
28. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp.336–40.
29. Y. Akc¸ura, U¨c¸ Tarz-ı Siyaset (Ankara: Tu¨rk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1976).
30. M. Belge, ‘Tu¨rkiye’de Zenofobi ve Milliyetc¸ilik’, in T. Bora (ed.), Milliyetc¸ilik (Istanbul: _Iletis¸im,
2002), p.186.
31. K. U¨nu¨var, ‘Ziya Go¨kalp’, in Bora (ed.), Milliyetc¸ilik, p.30.
32. Z. Go¨kalp, Tu¨rkc¸u¨lu¨gu¨n Esasları (Istanbul: Kum Saati Yayınları, 2001), pp.37–53.
33. M. Saatc¸i, ‘Nation-States and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish–Kurdish
Conﬂict’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol.8, No.4 (2002), pp.557–9.
34. A. Yıldız, Ne Mutlu Tu¨rku¨m Diyebilene (_Istanbul: _Iletis¸im, 2001), pp.286–90.
35. T. Bora, ‘‘‘Ekalliyet Yılanları’’: Tu¨rk Milliyetc¸iligi ve Azınlıklar’, in Bora (ed.), Milliyetc¸ilik,
pp.911–13.
36. A. Aktar, Tu¨rk Milliyetc¸iligi, Gayrimu¨slimler ve Ekonomik Do¨nu¨s¸u¨m (Istanbul: _Iletis¸im, 2006).
37. A. Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve ‘Tu¨rkles¸tirme’ Politikaları (Istanbul: _Iletis¸im, 2000), pp.140–41.
38. For more on these events, see D. Gu¨ven, Cumhuriyet Do¨nemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri
Baglamında 6–7 Eylu¨l Olayları (Istanbul: _Iletis¸im, 2006).
39. B. Oran, Tu¨rkiye’de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, Ic¸ Mevzuat, Ic¸tihat, Uygulama (Istanbul: TESEV
Yayınları, 2004b), pp.74–6.
40. On this, see B. Oran, ‘Azınlık Hakları ve Ku¨ltu¨rel Haklar Raporu’nun Bu¨tu¨n O¨yku¨su¨’, Birikim,
No.188 (2004, pp.17–25), and I.N. Grigoriadis, ‘Tu¨rk or Tu¨rkiyeli? The Reform of Turkey’s Minority
Legislation and the Rediscovery of Ottomanism’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.43, No.3 (2007),
pp.427–30.
41. Kurds were often accused of corrupting morality in the areas they migrated to, masterminding all
criminal activities in Turkey, exercising terror and violence on peaceful Turkish populations and
eventually aiming to marginalize the Turks in their own country through the increase of their
population into a majority due to higher birth rates. For more information on these opinions, see T.
Bora, ‘‘‘Kitle _Imhalarla Yok Etmek Lazım’’ – Gelis¸en Anti-Ku¨rt Hınc¸ U¨zerine’, Birikim, No.191
(2005), pp.36–43. A comprehensive account of the course of Turkish ethnic nationalism in the 1990s
can be found in T. Bora and K. Can, Devlet ve Kuzgun-1990’lardan 2000’lere MHP (Istanbul: _Iletis¸im,
2004).
Shifting Boundaries of the ‘Other’ in Greece and Turkey 181
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
5:2
3 1
5 J
uly
 20
14
 
42. Bora, ‘‘‘Kitle _Imhalarla Yok Etmek Lazım’’’, pp.43–5.
43. M. Yegen, ‘Tu¨rklu¨k ve Ku¨rtler: Bugu¨n’, Birikim, No.188 (2004), pp.32–5.
44. After failing to suppress the celebrations, Turkish authorities attempted to control and appropriate
the celebrations by claiming that they were essentially ‘Turkic’. On the invention of the Nevruz
tradition, see L.K. Yanık, ‘‘‘Nevruz’’ or ‘‘Newroz’’? Deconstructing the ‘‘Invention’’ of a Contested
Tradition in Contemporary Turkey’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.42, No.2 (2006, pp.285–6).
45. Ankara Bu¨rosu, ‘Genelkurmay: Bayrak Sevgimizi Sınamayın-Tu¨rk Milleti Bo¨yle Alc¸aklık Go¨rmedi’,
Milliyet, 23 March 2005.
46. I.N. Grigoriadis, ‘Upsurge Amidst Political Uncertainty: Nationalism in Post-2004 Turkey’, SWP
Research Paper 2006, No.11 (2006), p.13.
47. M. C¸elikkan, ‘Ku¨rt Sorunu’, Radikal, 26 March 2005; _Istanbul Bu¨rosu, ‘Olaylar Artıyor Yetkililer
Bakıyor’, Radikal, 9 Sept. 2006.
48. Oran, Tu¨rkiye’de Azınlıklar, pp.74–6.
49. On this also see, M. Yegen, Mu¨stakbel Tu¨rk’ten So¨zde Vatandas¸a: Cumhuriyet ve Ku¨rtler (Istanbul:
_Iletis¸im, 2006), pp.74–82.
182 I. N. Grigoriadis
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
5:2
3 1
5 J
uly
 20
14
 
